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Section VII — Risk Management

~13% of CQE exam

Risk Management Framework

Risk = Probability × Consequence (Severity)

Risk management process (ISO 31000)

  • Context: define scope, objectives, criteria
  • Identification: find sources, events, and consequences
  • Analysis: qualitative or quantitative; likelihood × impact
  • Evaluation: compare against risk criteria; prioritize
  • Treatment: avoid, reduce (likelihood or consequence), share/transfer, retain/accept (ISO 31000 also allows taking risk to pursue an opportunity)
  • Monitor & review: track residual risk; update with new info

Risk matrix (typical)

Severity →NegligibleMinorMajorCritical
LikelyLowMediumHighExtreme
OccasionalLowLowMediumHigh
UnlikelyNegligibleLowLowMedium

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

  • Top-down, deductive; starts with undesired top event
  • Works downward through logic gates to root causes (basic events)

Gate symbols

GateLogicFTA meaning
AND gateAll inputs must occurTop event requires ALL child events
OR gateAny one input sufficientTop event if ANY child event occurs

AND vs. OR probability

P(AND) = P(A) × P(B) [independent events]
P(OR) = 1 − (1−P(A))(1−P(B)) [independent events]
  • An AND gate models redundancy: the top event needs all inputs, so its probability is the product (smaller)
  • An OR gate models a series weakness: any input causes the top event, so its probability is larger
  • Minimal cut set: smallest combination of basic events that causes top event

FMEA (in Risk Context)

RPN = Severity × Occurrence × Detection [1–10 each]
  • High severity alone demands action — RPN doesn't capture this adequately
  • Actions target: reducing occurrence (design change) or improving detection
  • Severity can only be reduced by redesign; never by control plans alone

FMEA vs. FTA

FMEAFTA
ApproachBottom-up (inductive)Top-down (deductive)
Starting pointComponent failure modesUndesired top-level event
OutputList of failure modes with RPN/APLogic diagram; cut sets
Best forNew designs; comprehensive coverageSpecific scenarios; dependent failures

Hazard Analysis Techniques

TechniqueApplication
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)Early concept stage; identify major hazards; define initial safety requirements
HAZOPHazard and Operability study; process piping/equipment; systematic what-if using guide words (no, more, less, as well as, part of, reverse, other than)
What-If analysisBrainstorming-based; less structured than HAZOP; quick screening
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)Forward, inductive; starting from initiating event; traces consequences through system responses
Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMECA)FMEA + criticality ranking; adds criticality number (severity × probability)

Risk Treatment Strategies

StrategyDescriptionExample
AvoidanceEliminate activity or hazard entirelyDon't use a dangerous process
ReductionReduce probability or consequenceAdd safety interlocks, training
TransferShift financial impact to another partyInsurance, warranty contracts
AcceptanceConsciously accept residual riskDocument and monitor low-risk items

Hierarchy of controls

  • Elimination — most effective; remove hazard entirely
  • Substitution — replace with lower-risk alternative
  • Engineering controls — guards, interlocks, ventilation
  • Administrative controls — procedures, training, warnings
  • PPE — least effective; last resort

Key Terms Glossary

TermDefinition
HazardSource with potential to cause harm; inherent property
RiskProbability × consequence; potential for harm to be realized
Residual riskRisk remaining after controls have been applied
Cut setSet of basic events whose joint occurrence causes the top event
Minimal cut setSmallest cut set; no proper subset also causes top event
CriticalityCombined measure of severity and probability of a failure mode
ALARPAs Low As Reasonably Practicable — reduce risk until the cost of further reduction is grossly disproportionate to the benefit